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February 8, 1958

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

The American Political Tradition

RUSSELL KIRK

At Red China's Border

E. V. KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN

Non-Partisan Politicmanship

L. BRENT BOZELL

Articles and Reviews by · · · · · JOHN CHAMBERLAIN
FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN · WM. F. BUCKLEY JR.
RODNEY GILBERT · JAMES BURNHAM · EDWARD CASE

For the Record

Administration attempts to move Labor Secretary Mitchell into the Senatorial race in New Jersey are meeting political echoes of a year-old quote from Walter Reuther: "James P. Mitchell... is a friendly, personable man who is liked by most labor leaders who know him. We often regret that he is only a junior partner in the Eisenhower Administration." ... Eisenhower-Republican Senators on the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee have insisted that Candidate Robert Morris' name not appear on the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee report covering the year 1957. ... Intra-party feuding has reached the critical stage in Indiana, as well as California, jeopardizing two Republican seats in the Senate in the fall elections.

The Donner Foundation has underwritten the cost of sending 20,000 copies of Col. Augustin G. Rudd's Bending the Twig to school board presidents and educational leaders across the nation. The book is a study of the effects of so-called "progressive new-education" on students in the past twenty years. ... Available now, the latest edition of "Reading List for Americans" (Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly, 1212 Callahan Drive, Alton, Ill., single copy 10 cents).... Slipped into the booklet containing the 37th Annual Report of the American Civil Liberties Union was this note: "We regret that the names of Morris L. Ernst and Dorothy Kenyon were inadvertently omitted from the following list of board members."

* Exiled Socialist political leaders who rushed back to Venezuela in the wake of the revolution hastened to inform the population that Communists would be treated just as they are in the United States.... The U.S.-Soviet agreement on exchange of TV programs has raised some questions in the network offices: Can the government commit the use of privately-owned TV facilities? Will Soviet programs shown in this country be preceded by a "This is a paid political announcement" disclaimer?

* The only Communist to be returned to jail in recent weeks was San Francisco CP leader Oleta O'Connor Yates, who was resentenced to one year. It was Mrs. Yates' misfortune that she had been sentenced originally for criminal contempt and not, as were dozens of other recently released Communists, merely for conspiracy to overthrow the government—a Smith Act offense.

NATIONAL REVIEW

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

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The WEEK

• Mao Tse-tung, proclaims a *New York Times* headline, still "turns a neat furrow." The better to plow us under, my dear.

• In a speech delivered at Minsk, Nikita Khrushchev said that it might be a good idea to liquidate the "machine tractor stations" that for twenty-five years have been the mechanical and administrative backbone of Soviet agriculture, and to distribute their equipment to the local collective farms that they now service. The proposal, which may be allowed to rest at this verbal stage, seems to be: a) another move, or at least threat, against Khrushchev's party opponents, who are entrenched in the apparatus of the machine tractor stations as they were in the centralized industrial ministries; and b) an expression of the severe Soviet farm crisis, aggravated this past crop year by the collapse of Khrushchev's own "virgin lands" program. It may be recalled that the American farm experts who visited the Soviet Union in 1955 criticized the machine tractor station system as a wasteful bureaucratic monstrosity. It is nice to know that somebody may benefit from the Eisenhower "people-to-people" exchange program.

• At the Ankara conference of the Baghdad Pact, Secretary of State Dulles acted rather like the skittish young man at the wedding who couldn't remember whether he was supposed to be best man or bridegroom. In his relation to the Baghdad Pact, Mr. Dulles seems—to shift the image a few degrees—to want all the joys of matrimony without being willing to give the poor girl a ring. No wonder that lately (cf. the Iraqi grumblings a month ago) she's been making signs of calling the whole deal off—particularly when she suspects that her suitor's balkiness springs partly from the fact that he is still making eyes at that Egyptian hussy around the corner. U.S. diplomacy never learns that in a wicked world where most people are trying to get the better of most other people, the attempt to make everybody your friend is often self-defeating.

• As a measure of the desperate nature of its famine, Communist China has instituted a form of repression unusual even in the Communist world: Chinese citizens must now have a passport to travel within their own country. Designed to keep disgruntled peasants and "forced farmers" from flocking to the cities, the law automatically enslaves the rural population of China.

• They're feudin' again down in North Carolina: the Lumbees, 300 strong and armed with shot-guns and rifles, descended the other night upon an outdoor meeting of their foes, and put them to rout. It was not, however, a family matter, but one of high principle: the Lumbees are a tribe, not a family, and their enemies are, of all things, the Ku Klux Klan—who, the sheriff of Robeson County now says, got such a beating from the Lumbees that the Klan is not likely to rear its head again. The New York press has, incidentally, managed to divide in a peculiar way over the issue: the *Herald Tribune* is defending the Klan and its right to assemble, denouncing the Lumbees for using "force and violence"; the *Mirror* praises the Lumbees for acting like men in the presence of a "bunch of bully-bums." Us, we're not taking sides.

• We have never despaired of capitalism, but now we know that it is equal to any emergency. Medical schools and doctors, it seems, have been having trouble getting enough human skeletons for educational purposes (education is booming these days). In the bad old times an illicit business in grave robbing would have sprung up to satisfy the demand of the medical profession for more skulls and bones. But this is no longer necessary. A bright little group of enterprisers in Gatesville, Texas have set themselves up in the business of manufacturing imitation human skeletons—"just as good as Grandpa's"—out of plastics. The company is called the Medical Plastics Laboratory—and at last reports it had run a shoe-string into a \$100,000-a-year gross.

• Some, at least, of the appeasement seeds that the Kremlin has been sowing in Western Europe seem to be falling on stonier ground than expected by optimists on their side of the Curtain, or pessimists on ours. Little Greece, in spite of Cyprus and heavy Soviet pressure, last week announced its readiness to assign nuclear missile bases to NATO. A few days before, Italian spokesmen had sharply rejected the Bulganin promises and threats about "atomic neutralization." In West Germany, Erich Ollenhauer, chief of the Social Democratic Party, disclosed that the Adenauer government, although issuing temporizing public statements, has already made the decision for missile bases on West German soil, if these are judged militarily correct by the NATO command. Meanwhile Herr Ollenhauer's Socialists and all other West European Socialist and Communist parties are initiating all-out campaigns to block the NATO missile-site program.

• If some congressional committee ever makes up its mind to ask Dr. Linus Pauling about his petition of 9,000 scientists in favor of the Moscow-backed

proposals on bomb-testing, it might begin with a few simple questions on the practical side of the affair. Just how did Dr. Pauling, a busy professor of chemistry at Cal Tech, presumably of moderate professorial means, find the time and money to garner the signatures of more than 9,000 persons in 44 countries? Where did he get all the correct addresses? Who mimeographed the letters? put them in the envelopes? addressed the envelopes and licked the stamps (in correct amount for each country)? opened and collated the replies? Who paid for all this, and for all the telephone calls and telegrams there must have been? Anybody who has tried to get a dozen or two names for a local school board petition knows that an operation of the Pauling scale takes thousands of man-hours and tens of thousands of dollars.

• A particularly harrowing March of Dimes appeal this year amplifies the breathing of a child in an iron lung. It urges us to keep on giving to the March of Dimes so that this child and hundreds of thousands like him may receive the treatments which will lessen, even if only marginally, the handicaps under which they must pass the balance of their lives. The appeal is for help to the past victims of polio because, in this country at least, poliomyelitis is no longer a dread crippler. We wonder how many of those who sneer at American scientific achievement as they point to the Soviet moon, have tried to balance out Sputnik against the Salk vaccine. Sputnik is the product of the forced labor of captive scientists (whether German or Soviet-born); its development represents a material investment the Russian people can ill afford; its sole object was to put fear into the hearts of free men. The polio vaccine was developed by private individuals, Dr. Jonathan Salk and his associates, working in the laboratories of the University of Pittsburgh on grants provided by the charity-supported National Infantile Paralysis Institute. Its objective was as simple as this—to give life, not take it away.

• Do higher wages benefit the economy, spread prosperity, etc., as the trade union brethren proclaim? Or do they, as common sense assures us, merely mean more for the recipient of the higher wage and less for everybody else? The latter, so famed Harvard economist Edward H. Chamberlin flatly states. "Whoever receives a higher money income," he writes, "gains relative to others who do not"; and union leaders have no special claim to the "agreeable privilege of mysteriously spreading prosperity." What they do have is "more power," so that they "gain at the expense of those who have less [power]"—as, he adds, recent events clearly show. As for the remedy, Professor Chamberlin insists there is

no mystery about that: "diminish in some measure the degree of economic power in the hands of the unions . . ."

• The recent "trail-blazing" agreement to increase the "officially sponsored" cultural exchange between this country and the Soviet Union by as much as "fivefold" may prove to be a good thing for a lot of people who have tuxes and will travel. But aside from providing for some good junkets we doubt that it will play the slightest part in alleviating or changing anything. To begin with, the Russians have a way of inviting visitors to their country who are predisposed to amiability: the visitors don't ask searching questions, they don't attempt to persuade Soviet citizens that democratic capitalism is a better way of life, and when they ultimately return to the U.S. they extenuate what is going on in the land of the commissars. As for the Russians who visit the U.S., if they do learn anything new they scarcely dare breathe a word about it once they are back in the Soviet Union and within reach of the police. What is needed between the U.S. and the USSR is not a reciprocal exchange of officially chosen and approved "cultural ambassadors," but a decision to let totally unofficial travelers move across borders, even down to Trotskyists, anarchists and plain old-fashioned believers in the capitalist order. Any likelihood of getting that?

• In Iceland's municipal elections last week, the Independent Party—virtually the only party not in the left-wing coalition which rules the country—swept 52 per cent of the popular votes. This, to be sure, does not mean that the government must call new elections, but it certainly does mean that it took the people of Iceland just eighteen months of "progressive leadership" to see the light and forcefully indicate that, demagoguery or no demagoguery, they wish to remain an integral part of the NATO alliance. It is a small, but not unimportant, victory for U.S. diplomacy.

• Happy the man who gets to kill two birds with one stone! Happy, therefore, Harvard's Harlow Shapley, whose profession is fellow-traveling, whose avocation is teaching about the moon and the stars, and who gets an invitation from Colgate University to lecture on the Soviet Sputniks! Happy Colgate's students, who were presumably exposed to his fellow-orbiting for only one evening.

• We regret that Robert Morris cannot run for the Senate and continue as Chief Counsel to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. But, that being the case, we are delighted that the man to take his place should be J. G. Sourwine who, as Secretary to

the late Senator McCarran, and during a former term as Chief Counsel to the Subcommittee, has demonstrated both the dedication and the knowledge essential to the job. May we congratulate the Subcommittee and wish Mr. Sourwine well?

1944	1956
Warsaw	Budapest
Radio Moscow	Radio Free Europe
Warsaw Uprising	Hungarian revolution
Nazis liquidate General Bor's underground army	Soviets crush Freedom Fighters
Soviet Army stands by	U.S. Army stands by
Moscow disclaims responsibility	Washington disclaims responsibility

Caveat Vendor

Mr. Walter Reuther has a new idea for getting us out of the current recession, and preventing all future recessions: Let a new government agency—well, not *fix* prices in our major industries; that would be socialism, which Reuther is against, but rather “judge” prices; that is, decide from moment to moment whether proposed price increases are “justified.” Then leave each industry “free,” once it has been informed that a proposed increase is “unjustified,” to proceed as it sees fit: more power to it if, having been found guilty of attempting to exploit its customers, it can still sell its product.

The socialism, of course, is in the premises rather than the proposal itself. The premise, for example, that there is some way to tell, before the final sales figures are in, whether a price increase is “justified.” The premise, again, that “justified,” in such an economic system as ours, can have any meaning other than “profitable.” The premise, finally, that a concern is “unjustified” in going through with an “unjustified” price increase. Or to put that a little differently, that it is a sin, and ought to be a crime, for a concern to back its own estimate of market prospects with its own risk capital.

The proposal would not repeal the capitalist sys-

tem; the premises would. That system can operate only if it is clearly understood on all hands that, provided a firm is prepared to take the consequences of a mistaken judgment, the only “just” price for its product is that which its management deems likely to maximize its profits; that it has no obligation, save to its owners, to make correct judgments; and that to inject moralistic language like Mr. Reuther’s into the discussion of these matters is to poison the wells of public opinion. What he clearly wants is not “justified” prices, or even just prices, but *lower* prices—and, to that end, an arrangement whereby he can ruin, by recourse to the front pages, any firm that dares to defy him.

Magnanimity vs. Egotism

It would be an act of barbarism to dogmatize about the suicide of Robert R. Young, chairman of the New York Central Railroad. Mr. Young was a sensitive man who wrote poetry as an avocation, and he had generous ideas about what a capitalist system should do for its various beneficiaries. Did he kill himself out of some purely personal motive? Did his end come in one of those recurrent moods of world-weariness which afflicted him more and more after his daughter’s death in a plane accident in 1941? Or was it that, after all his promises, he simply couldn’t face up to the probability of a deficit year in the New York Central’s finances in 1958? Since Mr. Young was an extremely complex man, the impulse to self-destruction in his nature could have sprung from a whole variety of motives.

One thing, however, can be said with certainty: Mr. Young was a man whose awareness and magnanimity warred continually with his egotism, with the victory frequently going to the latter. He was quite sincere in wanting to do a good job with the American railroad system in general and the New York Central in particular. And he was quite right in his criticism of the Central’s inefficiencies when he first leveled a blast at the railroad’s management back in the mid-forties. But Mr. Young’s victory over the Central’s 1947 directorate had to be personal. It didn’t satisfy him that his bill of complaints was eventually acted upon. It didn’t satisfy him that his proddings resulted in a complete overhaul of the Central’s management under the extremely capable William White, who had been brought over from the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western. Nor did it satisfy him that Mr. White had made a bang-up beginning in 1953 toward putting the Central “back on the track.” No, Mr. Young had to seize all the credit for himself alone.

In pursuit of personal glory he staged his bitter

—and triumphant—proxy battle for control in 1954. In view of Mr. White's reforms in the Central's operations, the battle made little economic sense. One concrete result of Mr. Young's proxy victory was the loss of Mr. White's services, through resignation.

It would be foolish to argue that the loss of Mr. White was crucial: Mr. Young did go out and hire a competent railroad man in Alfred Perlman of the Denver and Rio Grande to run the Central. But Mr. Young's experiments with "Train X," with uniformed hostesses and big publicity budgets, never managed to put dollars in the Central's coffers. Where Mr. White had trimmed the Central's operating costs, Mr. Perlman was forced to compensate for the new operating frills by cutting drastically into maintenance. Mr. Young saw to it, of course, that the stockholders got increased dividends. But to do this he had to sacrifice some of the Central's real estate assets. The frills, the big dividends, the sale of assets and the skimped maintenance all add up to one thing: the Central is not in the best of shape to face depression.

And the moral? It has something to do with vain-glory. That was the one weakness of this charming man.

Hollywood and Pay TV

The *New York Times*, which could teach CIA a thing or two about the intelligence business, has got hold of a secret report just prepared by Sindlinger & Co. for the high command of the U.S. movie industry. Everybody has realized that the movies were in poor shape, but few suspected things were quite so bad as the Sindlinger report makes out.

Attendance, slipping for a long while, fell with a bang last September, when several studios released their pre-1948 films to TV. Since then there has been a seven million drop in average weekly movie theater attendance, a rate that represents an annual industry loss of nearly \$300 million. The public is now spending four times as many hours looking at old movies on TV as it does looking at new ones in theaters. If more recent movies are given to TV, predicts the report, this "would be a death blow to theaters and production."

If most people prefer to look at movies in their homes rather than in theaters and drive-ins, there's no law against it—yet, at any rate—and the movie producers had better adjust to the fact before they all go bankrupt. Pay TV looks to us like the sensible solution, though we shall probably all be in our graves before the FCC gives it a go-ahead. New

movies can be shown on pay TV sets at a modest fee, split between broadcasters and producers much as now between theaters and producers. Theaters and drive-ins can show them simultaneously with TV, for a higher admission price, where there is sufficient public demand. The abandoned portion of the theaters can be used to store old government files, in triplicate.

Of course it might also be some help to the movie industry if it put out better pictures, but a conservative journal like *NATIONAL REVIEW* is not going to suggest anything quite that radical.

No Immediate Restraint

Might Lester Pearson do less harm as Prime Minister of Canada than he did as Foreign Minister? It would be pleasant to think so; but the evidence, alas, points to the opposite conclusion. The Canadian system, like the British, is one of collective cabinet responsibility that heads up in a party leader. The latter's power to tailor the composition of his team to his own notions of policy is virtually without short-term limit; and the Foreign Minister is, in consequence, the Prime Minister's man, and wholly so.

The Lester Pearson we have watched run the Soviet Union's errands in recent years, in other words, has been a Lester Pearson subject to restraint by Mr. St. Laurent—a better Pearson by far, unless political degeneration has proceeded further in Canada than we like to think, than the Pearson we might have had in the absence of those restraints. We wish the Canadian Conservatives doubly well in all future elections.

History Moves On

There is not a Communist bone in Corliss Lamont's body, or in his wife's either. They are—it says so right here in a paid half-page ad in the *Times*—merely citizens, American citizens that is, who "for twenty-five years have been active in work for international peace, and for American-Soviet understanding and cooperation." Their ad, which consists of simultaneous and in large part identical letters to President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin respectively, is written in the "spirit of Albert Schweitzer's Declaration of Conscience"; so that any apparent similarity between their position and that of the Communists is purely coincidental. They even put "American" before "Soviet" in "American-Soviet," and not only in the letter to Eisenhower but also in that to Bulganin.

But the similarity does leap to the eye: No inter-

national agreement to stop H-bomb tests has been achieved. The tests constitute a "grave menace to the health and general soundness of the whole human race." Let Mr. Eisenhower, then, "take the initiative and stop the tests on a unilateral basis." Let Gospodin Bulganin also take the initiative and stop the tests unilaterally. (How they are both to take the initiative unilaterally the Lamonts don't say, but no matter.) Such a move would "catch the imagination of mankind." It would immensely stimulate disarmament, it would help "make successful any serious East-West negotiations." The American government and the American people would lose nothing by it; neither would the Soviet government and Soviet people; it is "clearly in the self-interest" of all.

Only on one major point do the two letters differ: the Lamonts tell Mr. Eisenhower that the U.S., having invented and first used the atomic bomb, has "a special moral responsibility" to make the move, but say nothing of this special U.S. responsibility, nor of any special Soviet responsibility, to Bulganin. So history does not merely repeat itself: the Lamonts have begun to keep secrets *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union!

Now, Children, Let's All Be Good Boys and Girls

The Administration's labor program, presented to Congress in a January 23 message from the White House, is a wonderfully typical instance of the Eisenhower style: goody-goody Boy Scout sentiments in abstract morality; proposals to clutter up the bureaucratic apparatus still more with tons of required new reports and a new "Commissioner of Labor"; and an absolute avoidance of all serious, relevant issues.

There is paragraph after paragraph of this sort of thing: "Union officials—most of whom are decent, honest Americans—are also doing much to eliminate the few in the ranks of organized labor who are corrupt." "Monies contributed by workers to union treasuries [should be] used solely to advance their welfare." "All labor organizations [should] . . . file annually with the Department of Labor detailed information as to their constitutions, by-laws and organizational structure and procedures."

There is not a word about:

- A. The fact that millions of American workers are coerced into joining organizations not of their free choosing, as a condition of making a living.
- B. The fact that labor unions are exempt from the laws against monopoly and coercive practices that apply to all other economic associations;
- C. The fact that unions are privileged to use their

tax-exempt incomes for political purposes prohibited to all businesses and business associations, and to all other tax-exempt institutions of any kind whatsoever.

Recommended Reading

We are indebted to Mr. William A. Caldwell of the *Herald Tribune* for bringing to light the experience of Mr. Harold A. Gilbert, a Stamford, Connecticut electrical engineer who, to kill a few moments in the waiting room of the public high school in Hackensack, New Jersey, leafed through a couple of flyers prepared for the student body. The list was of recommended reading in fiction for high school students. We reproduce that list painstakingly, exactly as it appeared on the mimeographed sheets examined by Mr. Gilbert.

The students were urged to read *Janice Meredith*, Paul Ford; *Laughing Boy*, Olivier La Forge; *Count of Monte Cristo*, Alex Duma; *Remember the End*, Agnes Turnbult; *The White Company*, Sir C. Doyle; *The Casting Away of Mrs. Leeks and Mrs. Aleshine*, Frank Stockton; *Beau Geste*, Percival Uron; *Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court*, Sam Clemens; *Ben Hur*, Lewis Wallace; *American Tragedy*, The, Theodore Dreiser; *Bridge of the San Luis Rey*, Thornton Wilder; *Don Quixote*, Miquel Cervantes; *Ethan Frome*, Edith Wharton; *Giants in the Earth*, A. E. Ralvaag; *Last Days of Pompeii*, Edward Bulwer Lytton; *Messr. Marco Polo*, Donn Byrne; *Porgy*, Dubose Heyward; *Teas of the D'Ubervilles*, Thomas Hardy; and *Vanity Fair*, U. M. Thackeray.

Who in the name of God, Mr. Gilbert exploded, compiled this list! The clerk of the school board announced calmly that the list had been prepared by the school librarian—who also served as assistant director of physical education. Did the clerk realize, asked Mr. Gilbert, that a mistake of one kind or other appeared in each book selection? The clerk—evidently surprised—said he would have some "fun" with that intelligence at the next "executive session."

Mr. Gilbert was not amused. He wrote to the *Tribune*: "I would be surprised if . . . the salaries of the superintendent of schools, assistant superintendent, clerk of the board, principal, assistant principal, students' counselors, boys' physical education director, assistant ditto, girls' physical education director, assistant ditto, psychiatrist, psychologist, nurse, music and band instructor and cafeteria staff do not total double the amount of the salaries paid for teaching the real subjects of education."

Who is to blame for that situation, we ask? Senator McCarthy and his Rain of Terror? Or could it be the ideologists of Progressive Education? •

NATIONAL TRENDS

L. BRENT BOZELL

Non-Partisan *Politicsmanship*

The politician who protests that "national security should not become a political issue" is sure to be either a) trying to make political points by saying that national security should not become a political issue, or b) afraid that his party is at a disadvantage on the defense question, or c) Dwight Eisenhower, who, we must concede, may mean what he says. The presumption, in other words, is that no politician (excepting possibly Eisenhower) could have gotten where he is with such deficient understanding of how the American political system does and should work.

Still and all, leaders of both of the great political parties seemed almost believable last week as one platitude after another rolled off the congressional mimeographs, proclaiming that "defense must be kept out of politics" or, for variation, that "politics must be kept out of defense." And this despite common knowledge that leaders of both parties were in more or less continuous caucus on the question of how to impale the opposition on alleged defense derelictions in the coming campaign. The problem for all concerned was how to put a campaign on the road without seeming to forsake the pieties.

The Republican Dilemma

For the moment, anyway, this task was infinitely harder for Republicans than for Democrats. The Democrats had the advantage of the natural offensive. As they were the party out of power, the blame for the nation's deteriorated defense position was, presumptively, somebody else's. Democrats could therefore campaign on a platform of "Throw out the rascals who let our defenses go to pot" without ever writing down such a platform and without ever uttering a word in its defense. (The situation was comparable to 1932 when FDR could have won the election by sitting tight in Albany.) With this strategic advan-

tage Lyndon Johnson, last week, could well afford the lordly sentiment: "The past is already for historians . . . let us seek solutions so that the future may be written by free world historians"—and could pick some points for "statesmanship" to boot.

Democratic leaders had no intention, of course, of leaving the past to historians, should Republican historians go out on the hustings—as they were bound to do, of course—and raise some questions about the last Democratic stewardship. But retaliation could wait a while: Democrats were advised to stay above it all until such time as the Republican attack made serious inroads—and thus pick up still further points, as the aggrieved party, for forbearance.

Onus of the Sputniks

For all of these reasons, the Republicans were in deep trouble. The reigning national mores required that something majestic be said about everybody putting his shoulder to the wheel and letting bygones be bygones. And the dire prospects for the 1958 election required that lots be said, immediately—about Democrats—to relieve the GOP of the onus of the Sputniks. Sensing, evidently, that no amount of public relations guile could make the two things that had to be said look like the same thing, the White House kicked over the traces. On one and the same night, it dispatched its man Eisenhower to Chicago and its man Adams to Minneapolis—Eisenhower to proclaim that "security and a just peace is not a partisan or political matter . . . [they must never] become the pawn of anyone's political chess-game," Adams to catalogue the Democrats' sins against security from Pearl Harbor to the Advent. The inconsistency was, of course, caught immediately: the Democrats screamed foul; the Liberal press pretended to be shocked

—it scolded Adams and grieved that Eisenhower was no longer master of his own house.

The Republicans knew they would have to live with the inconsistency; the best they could hope, however, was that Eisenhower would furnish a "cover" for their campaign arguments without blunting their effectiveness—and that the Democrats would soon be forced into the open.

So much for the element of hypocrisy in the present *contretemps*; of vastly greater importance is the element of foolishness that underlies it. We should not play politics with national defense? No; in one sense we should not. In the sense that our leaders may subordinate their recommendations on military policy to vote-getting considerations, "playing politics" is a very bad thing, indeed. (No worse, it might be added, than doing the same thing with regard to farm policy—except that the stakes are higher.) But none of our leaders today is doing this in defense matters. This is not what the fuss is about.

Defense Policy at the Polls

What the critics of "partisanship" have in mind is the practice of a) identifying certain policies with certain people and parties, b) calling these facts to the attention of the voters and c) suggesting they be taken into account when the voters go to the polls. In this sense, "playing politics" is not only a good thing—it is quite obviously indispensable for responsible popular government. The Republican Administration did not do enough about missiles? This is a fact that should be known when members of Mr. Eisenhower's party come around asking for votes. But before the electorate turns on the Republicans, should it not also be advised that the Democrats, when it was their turn, did *nothing* about missiles? And that they did nothing despite repeated intelligence warnings from the close of World War II on that the Soviets were concentrating on rockets? The President has said that since 1953 the U.S. rate of progress in the missile field has been faster than the Russians'. May not Republicans take the argument a step further and suggest that if the Democrats had done as well, we would now be ahead of the Russians? The

full record, true, is more complex. But why not talk about it?


The Establishment's demand for "non-partisanship" is reminiscent of the days when, in the name of "na-

tional unity" and "bi-partisanship," it sought to avoid popular referenda on internal security and foreign policy. On defense policy, it would seem to have no such axe to grind; its attitude, consequently, must be set

down as a reflexive reaction—a sign that reluctance to submit major policy issues to the people is becoming institutionalized. This is bad. Without party responsibility, democracy is a sham.



"If you can't wage Solidarity, wage Silence!"



The THIRD WORLD WAR

JAMES BURNHAM

The IRBM Transition

To: The Presidium
From: Intelligence Section
Subject: Strategic Problems of Missile Development, Phase III

... In military terms, the coming phase will be dominated by the operational advent of intermediate range (i.e., 700-3,500 mile) ballistic missiles. The true intercontinental missile belongs, as an operational weapon, to a subsequent phase that cannot yet be accurately dated. The still unsolved problems of ICBM guidance and re-entry suggest that this may be further off than publicly expected.

The first intermediate range missile units will, however, become operational on both sides within approximately a year. Fixed and moving launching sites, on and under the surface of both earth and water, and in the air, will be rapidly increased. This will initiate what we have designated Strategic Phase III, the IRBM phase, in the missile sequence. Phase III will last at least three, possibly five or more years.

From a military standpoint, Phase III will be for us a period of acute danger. The military balance, which has been improving during the past six years, will shift back sharply in the enemy's favor. This may easily be seen on the map.

What the Map Shows

The majority of our major power centers will be directly threatened by enemy IRBM's at their projected sites along our periphery—in Western Europe, the southern-tier Baghdad Pact nations, Okinawa, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, plus Polaris-carrying nuclear submarines approaching our northern frontier from beneath the Arctic ice.

Our own IRBM deployment will bring these enemy sites (except for the submarines) within range, together with all of Japan and most

of Western Europe. But the main and decisive enemy power centers—i.e., those within the continental U.S.-Canadian boundaries—will remain outside our target areas.

With respect to the dominant weapon of Phase III, we will thus be at a decisive military disadvantage. The enemy will have the direct capability of destroying our power base. We will not have the correlative direct capability of destroying his.

This military disproportion cannot be corrected until, when we are able to make *intercontinental* missiles fully operational, Phase III will give way to Phase IV. In Phase IV—whether or not the enemy also has ICBM's—we will have his main power centers in target, and will thus balance his missile potential.

Throughout Phase III, the enemy's geographically derived missile advantage tends—if he exploits it—to restrain our freedom of action, and could even throw us on the strategic defensive . . .

Pulling Missile Fuses

By the objective military conditions of Phase III we will necessarily be inferior to the enemy in direct confrontation. We must therefore derive our counter-moves from a *strategy of indirect approach*. The Presidium, under Comrade Khrushchev's guidance, foresaw the problem of Phase III, and turned to its solution after cleaning up the unfortunate Hungarian episode. Our operations are being mounted along the following lines:

1. Diversions in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, to turn the enemy's attention away from Europe, to obscure the fact that Europe is the main battleground, and to induce him to overlook his European advantage during Phase III.

2. A terror-seduction campaign of the familiar type to persuade the

peripheral nations to refuse the grant of IRBM sites.

3. A coexistence, disarmament and negotiation campaign seeking to delay enemy IRBM decisions.

4. A complex world campaign (in which the Sputnik coup was a neat accent) to persuade the enemy that our ICBM is so nearly operational that Phase III will be too short to have strategic significance.

These four lines, supplemented by the usual demoralization tactics directed in this case particularly at the scientists, may prove sufficient to neutralize the enemy's Phase III position, and even to permit continuing advance, granted that he shows his normal lack of offensive will. But of this we can never be certain; and, indeed, our current counter-moves seem to be having more effect on lay public opinion than on the enemy military command.

The Intelligence Section would be derelict in its Bolshevik duty if it minimized the threat signified by large numbers of operational IRBM's on our periphery. We recommend that the comrades of the Presidium consider additional emergency measures to delay the enemy shift to an IRBM operational basis, and thereby to give our crash ICBM program a chance to close the gap between Phase III and Phase IV. As two possible measures we note:

1. Activation of layers 2 and 3 of the S-cadres for physical sabotage of enemy missile production and testing.

2. Some real concessions. We hesitate to mention so startling a proposal, remembering the capitulators and opportunists who have in the past yielded to cowardice in the face of previous enemy threats. But our analysis indicates that, in spite of his seeming eagerness for negotiation, the enemy is not going to listen very long, this time, to discussions in which we offer nothing but words. If we are to slow his transition to an IRBM basis, we may have to take a step backward today, according to the Leninist rule, to take a dozen steps forward in the ICBM tomorrow.

We may be confident that if we offer some *real* concessions, even very minor ones, the enemy will be so amazingly relieved that he will grant in return almost anything that we might ask.

At Red China's Border

E. V. KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN

Hong Kong: Living Monument to Free Trade

In the last days of December 1957 Sir Alexander Grantham, the British Governor of Singapore, took a tearful farewell of the people of Hong Kong. A solemn ceremony took place in the sport stadium and Sir Tsui-in Chan, a social leader of the Chinese community, seconded by Lady Chan, offered to the departing Governor a check for the Grantham scholarship providing the gifted offspring of indigent Hong Kongers with the means for a higher education. It was a most moving scene, and 30,000 people, mostly Chinese from Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New Territories, sang "For he's a jolly good fellow." Here, at long last, is a place where the "twain" who "never shall meet" are coming together and where the foundations of a Free China are being laid, though with different means than in Formosa.

I came to Hong Kong with misgivings concerning British policy towards Red China, which seems to be "co-existence" pure and simple. But upon closer inspection the whole case of British recognition appears rather involved. I am the last person to doubt the British desire to trade with China and to make profits by all conceivable means; yet it seems that the threat to Hong Kong's survival—political and economic—also profoundly influenced the British policy-makers. Had they not permitted Hong Kong to be an "outlet" (and "inlet") of Red China, Peking might have attacked it long ago—all the more so since such an action could have been heralded as a move against "undemocratic colonialism." It would then have been very difficult to persuade the U.S. to come to its defense. Had not President Roosevelt tried to put pressure on Britain to return Hong Kong to China?

Britain felt responsible not only for the fate of the people of Hong Kong and Kowloon, not only for the farmers in the rural New Territories incorporated after the Boxer rising, but also for the flood of refugees.

Today almost three million people are tightly packed into the Hong Kong area and it takes extraordinary efforts by the British to find bread, work and lodging for these pitiable masses. Only a trickle now comes over the border, but still enough to worsen the problem, which can find only a temporary solution through an artificial industrialization of city and countryside. There has been a certain amount of American aid, especially from the National Catholic Welfare Conference which sees to it that the new arrivals get roofs over their heads and learn trades. But the British have done a work of rehabilitation and charity which deserves the highest praise.

In fact, it is the whole "colonial system" in Hong Kong which impresses the visitor. Hong Kong is not Macao, where a handful of Portuguese have transformed a city of almost 200,000 Chinese into a thoroughly Portuguese-looking settlement breathing the spirit of the mother country. Hong Kong and Kowloon are still basically Chinese. The police wear a uniform of British cut, but only occasionally does one discover among them a Caucasian face. High society in Hong Kong naturally is overwhelmingly British, but Chinese members are by no means rare and here and there a Britisher appears with his Chinese wife. Only in the center of Hong Kong (whose official name is Victoria) rise the palatial skyscrapers of the big banks, and unless one scrutinizes the passers-by one would imagine oneself to be not in Britain but in Canada or Australia. The rest of the city is truly Chinese. Victoria is built on a steeply rising hillside. Real estate is immensely expensive; probably nowhere in the world do so many people live in so little space.

Hong Kong is very well governed, and were it not for the refugees it would be a place of tremendous prosperity. Here is a living monument to free trade; Hong Kong is above

all a commercial emporium, and customs are exacted only for alcohol, tobacco and gold. As a result, shoppers come from all parts of the Far East. There are no fixed prices and the Chinese, being highly competitive in business, outbid each other. The net result is a remarkable prosperity marred only by the refugee problem.

This very prosperity of Hong Kong at the doors of proletarian China—a free economy displaying its advantages over a planned collectivism of the worst order—fulfills an important role. Religious liberty fulfills another; it is making the Hong Kong region a little China, Christian version. While religion is persecuted in Red China, the religious fervor of Hong Kong is rising. The Catholic Church alone gained 16,000 converts in 1956. The number of Protestants is also increasing.

Hostages at Home

Of course there are Communist agents in this British colony. There are some genuine Chinese Communists and an even greater number of Chinese who dare not antagonize Red China, not so much for commercial reasons as because they have relatives on the other side of the "Bamboo Curtain." The Chinese is above all a family man and it is to the family that he owes his only real allegiance—very much like the Spaniards who are as individualistic and as "familistic" as the Chinese. It is only too easy to put political pressure on the Hong Kong Chinese if they have "hostages" in the form of (even remote) relatives in Red China. On the other hand, the National Chinese Government on Formosa has many enthusiastic adherents in Hong Kong. The few red flags on October 1, and the many blue and red flags decorated with the white Sun on October 10, prove this.

It would be idle to maintain that Britain's relations with Red China do not provide that country with a number of benefits, but I believe that, after everything is said and done, the psychological, political and economic advantages accruing to the West are more impressive. I could wish, moreover, that many Americans would visit this Crown Colony; it might correct some of their views on

colonialism. The vast majority of Hong Kong's Chinese today are thanking God (or Buddha) on their knees that Mr. Roosevelt's highflying

ideas have not been put into practice and that today Hong Kong is a British colony rather than a part of "Mighty China."

Vietnam: Tragedy and Hope

Southeast Asia, for purposes of the politics and strategy of the Cold War, might possibly be treated as a coherent whole. But in actual fact it is an assortment of very divergent nations, races and religions. The Filipinos may be akin to the Malays (and Indonesians), but they have more in common with Spain (and the United States) than with the men now ruling Holland's former colonial empire, and spiritually they look rather to Rome than to Mecca. Vietnam is painfully divided by an Iron Curtain looping off the Tonkin area. Siam, which has never known colonial rule, is agreeably free from the resentment and occasional venom which characterize other parts of Asia's Southeast. Burma presents a curious political problem, under a government which tries to straddle the fence between slave world and free, but shows little capacity to cope with a restless interior populated by various mutually hostile tribes and faiths.

It is Vietnam which inspires the visitor with a double sense of tragedy and hope. It is extremely difficult to assay whether French rule here has been on the whole beneficent or oppressive. One hears recurrent complaints about French rudeness and toughness, accusations not without substance—the flighty, frivolous and liberal French *bon vivant* has always been a figment of Anglo-Saxon imagination. There are many Frenchmen who are as hard as nails and it is they who tend to go abroad—as pioneers, as planters, as soldiers or missionaries.

Yet whatever the fiber of the French, they have put their stamp on the Vietnamese and especially on their capital, Saigon, which looks in its central parts exactly like a city in the south of France. They have also left their religious mark on Vietnam which is now between a fifth and a fourth Catholic—an increase due to the many refugees from Tonkin ("Vietminh") where entire areas were Catholic. It is this refugee problem, largely but not entirely solved—there has been considerable American

aid—which slows up reconstruction. One can still find homeless people sleeping in the streets of Saigon.

One can hardly stay in Vietnam without rapidly developing a genuine affection and admiration for this people which is so touchingly childlike in its appearance and its soft language. Even in middle age the Vietnamese look like young boys and girls, the men developing beards only in advanced age and the women giving an impression of such daintiness and fragility that one wonders how they could ever have borne children—whom they adore and carry around piggy-back in the Far Eastern fashion. One can easily understand why such sensitive people did not get along with the French who, for instance, after a period of readjustment have accommodated themselves well with the Germans, each race being thick-skinned in its own way.

While the reconstruction is going ahead in spite of the refugee problem, this amputated country faces other questions. Reunion with the much richer Tonkin is probably as much a dream as the reunion of divided Korea or Germany. Nobody could imagine Comrade Ho Chi Minh permitting free elections in the North. South Vietnam has a very able Premier, the brother of a Bishop, and the complaint that he leans too strongly on America should not be taken seriously. This accusation is merely a hangover of an anti-colonialism which suspects the West in all its forms and manifestations. Today Vietnam is very firmly in the Western camp and its anti-Communism is a dynamic force kept alive by the refugees whose tales of their experiences effectively destroy all neutralist illusions.

Chinese Refugees

Apart from the refugees, there is another internal problem in the form of the Chinese minority. Enormous population pressure and the horrors of life under the Red Star have driven millions of Chinese from their home-

land. In the entire Indo-Chinese and Indonesian area we find the Chinese engaged in a great variety of activities, monopolizing some, intruding in others. Usually they work harder than the native population, and many of them end up by amassing great wealth. There can be no doubt that among the millionaires of Vietnam, Cambodia, Siam, Malaya and Indonesia at least 80 or 90 per cent are Chinese. However, in these regions there are also Chinese who are bitterly poor and therefore open to Communist propaganda.

In other words, there exists in Asia's Southeast a "Chinese problem" resulting in a tendency to restrict Chinese immigration. The majority of the Chinese are, at heart, staunch anti-Communists. But, because of loyalty to relatives in Red China, the "foreign Chinese" (who according to Chinese notions are those of the third generation born abroad), as well as the recent Chinese immigrants, are both inclined to walk a cautious middle way. This does not mean that the Chinese are politically dispassionate; that they merely look after their own interests. During the Kowloon riots in the Hong Kong area their passions ran so high that it took energetic British action to restore law and order. Yet to the various nations of the Southeast the Chinese represent a well-nigh unassimilable minority which is not always popular but which is essential to their economic well-being. Again, it would be false to say that the Chinese are disloyal to their adopted countries. The generosity of the rich members of the Chinese community toward enterprises of common interest and welfare is proverbial.

But one wonders about the future. The Chinese in Vietnam are concentrated in Cholon rather than in Saigon, but Bangkok is between 60 and 70 per cent Chinese, Singapore 80 per cent. If Singapore merges with Malaya—a projected move—then half of the population of the Malay State will be not Malays but Chinese, and it will be by far the richer and more enterprising half. The incorporation of Singapore into the Malay State will thus mark the end of its Malay (and Moslem) character. The rise of an even bigger China—Red, pink or free—becomes a distinct possibility.

The American Political Tradition

Social reformers would sweep all the pieces of our political tradition off the board, unaware that it is they that render America civilized

In his little book, *The Decline of Wisdom*, M. Gabriel Marcel observes that to many modern men the weight of tradition is onerous: they wish to shake from their shoulders the wisdom of their ancestors. Tradition is what G. K. Chesterton called "the democracy of the dead," the body of considered opinions of the wise men who have preceded us in time. It is the filtered experience of the race.

"The dead alone give us energy," Le Bon wrote once; but the contemner of tradition trusts to his little private stock of rationality and his overweening ego for sustenance in our Wasteland. In much of the world, the voices that speak for tradition are dinned under by more drums than those which beat to drown the last words of Charles I. Yet I think that tradition, like King Charles on the fatal scaffold, will be heard nevertheless, in the age which is dawning, though a social catastrophe may intervene to vindicate the truths of tradition. "Nay, but I shall be heard, and that to the end of time."

Much of what is said about tradition in America nowadays seems to me to be cant or hypocrisy—identification of one's pet ideology or one's private interests with "tradition," or else employment of the word "tradition" to cloak some design for altering the civil social order. Therefore it is refreshing to read books that treat of tradition with candor, whatever opinions their authors may have of tradition's worth. I think, for instance, of Mr. Louis Hartz's *The Liberal Tradition in America*, and Mr. Richard Hofstadter's *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It* (recently reissued as a paperback); and also Mr. Hofstadter's more recent *The Age of Reform*. These writers possess some genuine knowledge of what the political traditions of this country have

been, and clearly believe that they are now obsolete. Mr. Hartz retains affection for some elements in those traditions, but he tells us that we must transcend them:

Instead of recapturing our past, we have got to transcend it. As for a child who is leaving adolescence, there is no going home again for America. . . . [This challenge] holds out the hope of an inward enrichment of culture and perspective, a "coming of age," to use the term of the twenties again, which in its own right is well worth fighting for. What is at stake is nothing less than a new level of consciousness, a transcending of irrational Lockianism, in which an understanding of self and an understanding of others go hand in hand.

If the preceding passage from *The Liberal Tradition in America* seems obscure, I must remark that it is no easier to apprehend in its context; as Mr. Daniel Boorstin says of this book, it is itself an illustration of what ails American liberalism today—abstract, bookish in the bad sense, and insulated against reality.

Mr. Hofstadter, a better writer and more original thinker, knows more about our political tradition than Mr. Hartz, and likes it less. The men who made that tradition, according to Mr. Hofstadter—the Founding Fathers, Jefferson, Jackson, Calhoun, Lincoln, Phillips, Bryan, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, Hoover, FDR, and the rest—all were somehow unsatisfactory, captive in some degree to Mr. Hartz's "irrational Lockianism."

A Condescending Smile

For Mr. Hartz and Mr. Hofstadter, tradition is a devil-term: tradition is something you try to transcend as fast as you can, tugging dull conservatives along behind you. The masters of politics of the past two or three centuries were myopic men, even at their most liberal; from the height of our modern enlightenment

RUSSELL KIRK

we may condescend to smile at their limitations; but we ought to thrust off the hand of this dead ancestry and march away in some rational new direction, with only our modern pragmatic rationality for guide and governor. An aside of Mr. Hofstadter's, in the introduction to his *American Political Tradition*, sufficiently summarizes this view of the past and future of American politics:

Although it has been said repeatedly that we need a new conception of the world to replace the ideology of self-help, free enterprise, competition, and beneficent cupidity upon which Americans have been nourished since the foundation of the Republic, no new conceptions of comparable strength have taken root and no statesman with a great mass following has arisen to propound them. Bereft of a coherent and plausible body of belief—for the New Deal, if it did little more, went far to undermine old ways of thought—Americans have become more receptive than ever to dynamic personal leadership as a substitute. This is part of the secret of Roosevelt's popularity, and, since his death, of the rudderless and demoralized state of American liberalism.

For Mr. Hofstadter, the duty of the statesman is to ride on the crest of the mounting wave of events, furthering "existing tendencies toward organization," though never judging of the moral effects of the "industrial discipline" and "a managerial and bureaucratic outlook" which Mr. Hofstadter notes and smiles upon as the marks of the new America. The future, somehow, *must* be better than the past, if only we apply our rationality toward the hastening of change; in any event, we do not make our world, but merely apologize for it—so Mr. Hofstadter thinks. (Here Mr. Hofstadter and Mr. Hartz fall out, Mr. Hartz agreeing with Mr. F.S.C. Northrop that history is made by the premises which

men hold, Mr. Hofstadter embracing a genteel determinism.)

Mr. Hofstadter's and Mr. Hartz's version of the history of American politics is that all our leaders labored under a Lockian, or "conservative and Manchesterian" orthodoxy, whether they were called conservatives or liberals; we have little now to learn from the achievements of these leaders, though we may profit from a study of their deficiencies.

In justice, I must add that both these writers make some valuable criticisms of our present discontents, reminding us of how old principles, decayed into ideology, can defeat the very end they were intended to attain. Mr. Hofstadter and Mr. Hartz raise important questions. I am concerned just now, however, with whether these scholars give us an accurate description of American political traditions, and whether they do justice to the role that tradition ought to have in any scheme for rescuing modern society from its difficulties.

Is "Lockianism," or "the ideology of self-help, free enterprise, competition, and beneficent cupidity" the essence of our political tradition? I think not. I happen to agree with Mr. Daniel Boorstin that the genius of American politics consists in our habit of refraining from abstract doctrine and theoretic dogma; as a people, we have not been doctrinaires, neither bookish adulators of Locke nor speculative Benthamites.

The True Roots

Our principles of self-help, free enterprise, competition, and "beneficent cupidity," though encrusted with a veneer of nineteenth-century dialectic, are of origins much older than the political economy of Manchester or even the Treatises of Locke. Nor are these principles really at the root of the American political tradition. It seems to me that our political tradition is rooted in two bodies of opinion and custom: first, the Christian religion; second, the English and colonial historical experience in politics, with its fruits of representative institutions, local government, private rights, and the supremacy of law.

We have been governed by a genuine tradition—that is, a body of be-

liefs passed on from generation to generation, as prescriptions, customs—and not by ideology, or rigid and abstract dogma. As Mr. Boorstin says, the American Revolution was a revolution without dogma; and the whole course of our subsequent political history has taken the Revolution for its model. Mr. Clinton Rossiter, in his *Seedtime of the Republic*, puts this clearly: "What is especially amazing about modern American political thought is not that it continues to employ the idiom and exhibit the mood of the Revolution, but that both idiom and mood seem adequate to deal with many present-day problems."

Now this political tradition is neither Mr. Hartz's "irrational Lockianism" nor Mr. Hofstadter's Manchesterian ideology. This tradition seems healthy; and its principal ingredients, I think, are the Judaic-Christian faith and that legacy of institutions which Orestes Brownson called our "territorial democracy." And it is altogether possible that if we endeavor to "transcend" this tradition, by substituting for our prescriptive faith some utilitarian or pragmatic system of ethics, and replacing our territorial democracy by some neat scheme of central administration, then we may not succeed at all in meeting the problems of modern society. We may succeed only in breaking that continuity of custom and institution upon which rests any decent social order.

"In a corporate and consolidated society demanding international responsibility, cohesion, centralization, and planning," Mr. Hofstadter writes in *The American Political Tradition*, "the traditional ground is shifting under our feet." So it may be; but this does not prove it is centralization and planning we need. Who "demands" such grandiose innovations? I dislike this passive voice. Are we, as the Greeks thought they were, subject utterly to Fate and Fortune? If the traditional ground is shifting under our feet, possibly our real need may be to renew our understanding of our traditions, and to set to work solving our present problems in the light of that knowledge.

I venture only to suggest here the deficiencies of Mr. Hofstadter's and Mr. Hartz's respective analyses of those elements which I believe to

lie at the heart of our tradition—religious faith and institutional territorial democracy. As for the first, both authors pay only the briefest respects to our Christian heritage, which underlies all our political postulates; and much of what they do say is erroneous or misleading.

Mr. Hartz, it is true, does remember that the founders of the American Republic "refused to join in the great Enlightenment enterprise of shattering the Christian concept of sin." But he attaches an inordinate importance to the doctrines of Locke, as if he thought that the signers of the Declaration and the framers of the Constitution were *philosophes*, taking their first principles from philosophical treatises. Much of what he calls "Lockian" is infinitely older than Locke: it is bound up with those assumptions concerning human dignity, personality, conscience, charity, and duty which are included in Christian ethics.

Nor would it be difficult to demonstrate that the King James Version and the Book of Common Prayer, rather than Locke's Second Treatise, gave these American minds their cast. If one must turn to philosophers, probably Richard Hooker, directly or indirectly, had far more to do with the fundamental opinions of the Founding Fathers than did Locke. Americans have had no difficulty in agreeing with Edmund Burke for the reason that they, like Burke, have formed their opinions of human nature and society on the authority of Christian tradition.

Some of Mr. Hofstadter's infrequent comments on religion are even more misleading than Mr. Hartz's. Take this: "The men who drew up the Constitution in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787 had a vivid Calvinistic sense of human evil and damnation and believed with Hobbes that men are selfish and contentious." Well! In point of fact, the majority of the framers of the Constitution were not Calvinists, but Anglicans; and almost to a man they were contempters of Hobbes, if they had read him at all. The American statesman with perhaps the most "realistic" view of human nature (Mr. Hofstadter's phrase), John Adams, detested the works of Hobbes. Hobbes, as a political theorist, is read by modern professors of politics; he

never has had much influence on anyone else, except upon some of the nineteenth-century English Philosophical Radicals and Utilitarian writers on jurisprudence. Mr. Hofstadter does, indeed, recognize that religious belief had some influence upon the formation of our political institutions; but a recognition so confused does very little to help us understand the American political tradition.

Living Strength

Religious and ethical premises aside, the American political tradition, in its essence, has not consisted in "Lockian" abstractions about society, or in certain Manchesterian secular dogmas. It is embodied, instead (as Professor Carl J. Friedrich suggests) in "certain written documents available for inspection and detailed consideration"—the Declaration of Independence, the Constitutions of the United States and the several states, and the principal writings and speeches of Washington, Madison, Hamilton, and Adams. It takes form in our prescriptive system of government; it is a juridical tradition, sheltered by regular forms of appeal to the courts. It subsists in our township and county political organizations, our state governments, our limited federal government, our respect for political checks and balances, our ideal of a government of "laws, not of men," our practice of filtering democracy through a variety of representative bodies. It lives in our political parties and in our jealous regard for private and local rights.

Positive law, or written constitutions, may have given these prescriptive social forms their being; but they have taken on the force of tradition, and now are sustained by popular respect and habit, not by any effectual administrative force. Attacks upon these customs and forms arouse all the dread and indignation which generally are the symptoms of genuine popular attachment to traditions. Our "territorial democracy"—local self-government, for the most part decentralized and characterized by volition, kept in check by strict limitations upon the political administration—is our real tradition in the secular sphere. The

"ideology of self-help, free enterprise, competition, and beneficent cupidity" of which Mr. Hofstadter writes—so far as that "ideology" is not simply a part of Western civilization—is superficial, compared with the strength of this real tradition of territorial democracy.

Mr. Hofstadter is one of a number of scholars who are fond of arguing that the character of our traditions is being, or has been, profoundly altered by changes in the racial and cultural character of the American population, together with complex fluctuations in the status of social groups. The immigrants from central and southern Europe, it is often argued, will not be bound by the old American political tradition. Yet the evidence is strong, on the contrary, that a great part of the immigrants and their children and grandchildren are even more strongly attached to these political traditions than are Americans of older stocks. For they have to acquaint themselves with the traditional documents to which Dr. Friedrich refers, in applying for citizenship; and, conscious of their newness in America, they feel a compulsion to understand and support American establishments.

No Alternative Provided

Whether one wants to preserve a tradition, or to transcend it, he needs first to make sure of what that tradition is, and what it has done to nurture a nation's life. Nations do not endure without traditions. Some traditions may become obsolete; all require to be scrutinized, respectfully, now and then, in the light of right reason, lest they ossify. Traditions do take on new meanings with the growing experience of a people. And simply to appeal to the wisdom of the species, to tradition, will not of itself provide solutions to our present discontents. The endeavor of the intelligent believer in tradition is to so blend ancient custom with necessary amendment that society is never wholly old and never wholly new. He believes that tradition is a great storehouse of filtered wisdom, and that sudden breaks with tradition, however abstractly rational, may sweep away a great deal that is good with a little that is bad.

Now I do not think that Mr. Hartz

and Mr. Hofstadter, for all their learning, really apprehend the significance of the American political tradition; nor do they attach sufficient importance to the civilizing influence of tradition in general. In "transcending" our traditions, derived from Christian faith and from the civil social experience of English and American history, they would soon come under the necessity of recognizing or establishing some alternative set of traditions.

They do not present any such set of traditions. They have disavowed Marxism; they are aware in some degree, at least, of the deficiencies of old-fashioned rationalism; they are a little embarrassed about socialism; certainly they want to be called "Liberals," not socialists. They exhibit some prejudices against our prescriptive territorial democracy; they talk of centralization, planning, unification; they imply the creation of some sort of elite of centralizers and planners, presumably governed by the general aspirations of socialism, though emancipated from strict socialist ideology. But men do not live and die by the speculations of "democratic socialist" scholars, or rest their hopes upon "transcending Lockianism."

The man who respects tradition prefers the devil he knows to the devil he doesn't; and he is not disposed to sweep away a body of beliefs that has served us well in exchange for some new domination to which its prophets cannot even put a name. The American political tradition has given the American people a higher degree of justice and order and freedom—taking society as a whole—than any other political tradition, with the exception of the English, has conferred upon any other people.

Tradition, like other things, may be judged empirically—though that is not the exclusive standard of judgment. Our political tradition has been fruitful, and I think that the prudent social reformer must make his amendments in consonance with it, for the sake of giving his society renewed vitality. His only alternative is to sweep all the pieces off the board. But then he would not be playing the same game, or reforming the same nation, or, conceivably, dealing with civilized human beings.

from HERE to THERE

JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

In the thirties the journalistic woods were full of schemes to take us piecemeal from a competitive economy to collectivism. It was the "Fabian approach," the "inevitability of gradualism." The success of many of these schemes in achieving their political ends has been accompanied all too often with a feeling of helplessness on the part of conservatives and libertarians. In consequence they have fluctuated between a "what's the use" attitude and a dogmatic insistence on reiterating the pure milk of the individualist word. To the possibility of compromising toward their own object of desire—a wholly voluntary society—they have turned a deaf ear. They have not grasped the possibilities of a "Fabianism in reverse."

This department proposes to remedy that deficiency. Once a month it will canvass the proposals, which in the present intellectual climate are invariably still-born, for working back by non-revolutionary degrees toward the goal of a voluntary society. When compromise is involved, the single test will be: "Does it favor the side of economic and social freedom in the classic, as opposed to the modern collectivistic, liberal sense?" We don't ask for immediate purity; what we do insist upon is that contemporary currents should be reversed.

Solving the Farm Problem

Pick up almost any issue of the *New York Times* and you will find it spotted with items, little and big, which testify to the astounding fecundity of modern agriculture. A little item: "A new rust-resistant hybrid sunflower seed will be available in 1960." A big item: "Crop production this year matched the previous record despite the smallest total acreage since 1919."

In other words, what all the classical economists, from Malthus and Ricardo to John Stuart Mill and Nassau Senior said couldn't happen has most definitely happened: agriculture has become subject to the law of increasing returns. The law, to be sure, does not operate in the old-fashioned way: you do not gain proportionately more corn from a farm of limited acreage by putting an extra man to work. But if you relinquish that extra man to industry to make an Oliver corn-planter or a new liquid fertilizer, he will enable you to produce a whopping crop with far fewer employees.

The amazing productivity of the American earth is obvious from a simple statistic: where it took 90 per cent of the people to feed the whole population in Jefferson's time, today

it takes only 12 per cent to feed—nay, to glut—the remaining 88 per cent.

For twenty-five years, however, our political policy has been to negate all the benefits which might have accrued to the 88 per cent of non-farmers from the technological revolution on the farm. We have labored, mightily, to keep dinner-table costs high. The political justification for this is that farmers must prosper if the rest of us are to prosper. But the truly grim irony of all our agricultural programs of recent years is that they have benefited only the farmers who have not been in drastic need of help. Subsistence farmers have received few benefits for the obvious reason that they have had no surpluses to sell under price-support programs. The more efficient farmers, on the other hand, have used the new machinery and fertilizers to cut their labor costs without being forced to pass on any appreciable savings to the ultimate consumer.

Because of twenty-five years of insane policy, the problem of spreading the benefits of the technological revolution in agriculture over the populace as a whole has become almost insurmountable. Some \$50 billion have been spent to bail the farmer

out of trouble. Yet with all the outlay for fixed supports, sliding scale supports, acreage reduction, and the Soil Bank, the surpluses remain sky-high.

Nature vs. Politics

If the problem were only economic, nature could be left to take its course. The 45 per cent of the nation's farmers who produce 90 per cent of the nation's food—and on largely family-owned farms, at that—would manage to get along in a free market. The remaining 55 per cent (which is to say, the inefficient ones) would go out of business and, eventually, find something better to do. No political party would last ten minutes, however, if it were to advise letting nature take over. Witness poor Mr. Benson's troubles for merely hinting that price supports should be limited to putting a floor under the farmer, not to maintaining his purchasing power close to Korean War highs.

Politics being what they are, a formula must be found to go from "here to there." Although this would seem to call for magic, the Committee for Economic Development has, *mirabile dictu*, come up with just such a formula in a statement called "Toward a Realistic Farm Program." Despite the CED's previous penchant for economic centralization, this time it seems to have hit the nail on the head. Its idea, which is simplicity itself, consists of two major propositions: 1) "Let the free market take over for wheat, cotton, corn, etc.", and 2) "Let the government retire all marginal farms by paying compensation to their owners while they are training themselves for other jobs."

The CED program would cost money. But the taxpayer would be relieved of at least one burden: he would not have to pay continuing high prices for his groceries. The market price would prevail, the surpluses would disappear, and as the marginal farmers succeeded in relocating themselves the program would be blessed with "terminal facilities."

Safeguards would have to be evolved, of course, to prevent political racketeering in poor land at the taxpayer's expense. But this is a detail. The main fact is that the CED has outlined a program that need not entail suicide for the politician who first offers it as a bill.

THE IVORY TOWER

WM. F. BUCKLEY, JR.

The Role of the College Chaplain

III. The Compact (Conclusion)

The college chaplain is a relatively new figure on campus. It is not surprising, under the circumstances, that his role should be ambiguous. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and in much of the nineteenth, college chaplains would have been supererogatory, since the whole of education was implicitly bound up with religion; indeed, many members of the faculty and administration were ordained ministers.

But as education was secularized, the need for formal representatives of religion was perceived, and the college chaplain, in the modern sense, was born. His role, however, was not clearly conceived, though clearly he was thought of less as a teacher than as a sort of spiritual aide-de-camp. Those colleges that have come to realize that as a field of study religion is important, have added religion courses to the curriculum. But the teachers of these courses, as we have seen, are not presumptive believers in religion: they are not asked to be concerned with religion other than as social, historical and philosophical phenomenon.

Thus the college chaplain became the only official representative of religion who also, *ex officio*, believes in religion. Consistent with their undefined standing, college chaplains are seldom directly sustained by the college. They, and whatever denominational facilities they offer, are generally paid for by alumni and by the students themselves. The college furnishes official recognition, which entitles the chaplain to use college facilities.

It is the chaplain's groping for identity that is causing friction in many college campuses, and that was the root cause of the screeching case of Father Halton in Princeton. Depending as the chaplain takes his religion seriously, he will reach—not in his behalf, but in his religion's—for status. The chaplain who feels

that his duty to his religion consists primarily in making himself available to students with personal problems will not feel strongly the need to affirm the credentials of theology. The chaplain who feels that however serious his religion, the authorities have circumscribed his role—that those activities not expressly delegated to him are reserved to others—will not, by his creative vision, contribute to a sharpened understanding of the role of the college chaplain. But the man who views with apostolic concern the faith of the students he is there to look after will do everything in his power to guard that faith; and he will begin by patiently asserting the intellectual legitimacy of religion. Thus he will be drawn into the academic vortex and, provided he can take care of himself, will in due course become an active and integrated member of the academic community.

Three to Serve

The college chaplain has three masters to serve. He is responsible to the parents who retain him to render service to their young. He is responsible to the college with which he associates. And he is responsible to his God. The parents may properly insist that the chaplain show himself equipped by temperament and understanding to deal with students. *The college may properly insist that college chaplains be intellectually equipped and academically prepared to associate as equals among scholars.* The chaplain should insist that, as witness to the Beatific Vision, he be granted at least the attention given, say, to those who view the world as the discovery of Sigmund Freud.

By recognizing the rights and duties of all parties, the role of the college chaplain takes shape. The Reverend John Jones is entitled to

ask, in behalf of Christianity, the respectful attention due to a total and profound view of man and his universe, and to assert his right to pick up any gauntlet cast down by religion's detractors. The college is entitled to reject the Reverend Jones—on the grounds that he is not intellectually equipped to reveal religion's serious side. And the parents and alumni (who act through trustees of campus religious organizations) are entitled to say that the Reverend Jones, though a first-rate scholar, is about as approachable as Toscanini, and hence unsuited to the role of college chaplain.

The deadliest technique being used in the academic world against religion is its relegation to mere ritual. "Let them keep their organ music and their religious imagery and their hymn-singing [the secularists tend to feel] as quaint and not unsightly relics of a deluded past, so long as they give up dogma. Religion, degutted, cannot seriously get in our way." The secularists are satisfied to ease religion along in its evolution toward a genteel humanitarianism with a rich historical and literary tradition; its practitioners can even be permitted an occasional quasi-mystical invocation. "If we define being religious as being concerned with the basic questions of life," wrote the chairman of Yale's Protestant undergraduate organization recently in the *Yale Alumni Magazine*, "then undergraduate Yale has strong religious inclinations." Indeed: and by that definition Bertrand Russell is very religious too. "But if we mean by religion a genuine commitment to a historical [ly described] tradition, it is hard to make out much of a case for what might be called a religious renascence among the students."

That is square talk: squarer by far than the talk of a great many college chaplains, these days, whose concern is more to justify themselves and assuage the fears of alumni than to grapple with infidelity. The standing of the college chaplain in the academic community reflects the standing of religion in that community. College chaplains should ponder that one.

(Reprints including all three of Mr. Buckley's columns on the role of the college chaplain are available at 25¢ each, 10 for \$2.00, 100 for \$10.00.)

»BOOKS·ARTS·MANNERS«

Icing the Mind

FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN

"Do you enjoy a fast-paced discussion with intelligent people?" Do you consider yourself an "equal among equals" and would you like to "get together" with these equals among whom you are equally equal? Do you want the kind of education given Thomas Jefferson; do you want to go to school under Plato and Aristotle, Kant and Hume; do you believe that leisure must not be wasted in strumming the guitar or playing chess; do you believe in democracy; do you want to get wise?

Well, brother, never give up. Join the Great Books Program sponsored by the Great Books Foundation, publisher of the Great Books. In friendly informal surroundings, guided by leaders who are "fellow citizens . . . good humored and tolerant" just like you—"The Great Conversion" will teach you "The Great Ideas" that "make life worthwhile."

One hesitates to attack the Great Books Foundation. It is like throwing stones at Boy Scouts. The obvious sincerity of the leaders of the Foundation commends the movement to anyone standing in the Western tradition. Were the Great Books seminars solitary protests against pragmatism, were they auxiliaries in the total education of a man, any civilized person would welcome them as allies in the rearguard action being fought today against educational barbarism. He would see in the Great Books program a rather limited and naive affirmation of our common culture, an affirmation failing in depth because innocent of history, lacking in breadth because initiated by men but imperfectly formed by the corporate wisdom of Christendom. He would tolerate the excessive rationalism. He would forgive the forced egalitarianism. He would be a Roman using Gauls and Visigoths against Huns from the East.

Here the analogy breaks down. The Great Books program does not content itself with being an auxiliary. The program advances itself as the alternative to pragmatism. In the philosophy of the movement education has ceased to be that subtle and plastic informing of wisdom in a man in accordance with his role in life and his moment in history. Education has ceased to be that analogous act whereby men are brought to know themselves and their destiny through song and sculpture, poetry and play, master and book. Education has become something univocal, monolithic: the disengagement of

Great Ideas from a rather arbitrarily selected list of Great Books, a list, incidentally, heavily weighed in favor of the political liberalism underlying the Adler-Hutchins mentality. Insisting, in a piece of historical naïveté unparalleled in America, that until the advent of the industrial revolution only a clique of aristocrats were favored with an education, the Great Books devotees propose to open this treasure to every citizen within our "industrial democracy."

Apparently unaware that the cult of "Ideas" was ushered into the West a scant four hundred years ago; innocent of the simple historical truth that until the Renaissance the Western philosophical tradition addressed itself to *things*—to subjects—and not to ideas; oblivious of the scholarly commonplace that many masterworks of our tradition cannot be understood outside their historical context; ignorant of history which is the very soil and indeed the being of culture—the Great Books Program simply cannot deliver the goods it promises: the education of a man in the Western inheritance.

Too many Americans have been

duped for a decade into believing that the Great Books method is the answer to John Dewey. This results from confounding an abstract opposition with an existential opposition. While abstractly opposed, both progressivism and Great-Books-reading grow out of the same desperate groupism. Even the common symbol of the "round table" as the place of education recurs constantly in the literature of both groups. Both manifest a morbid fear of letting anyone really teach: both have a pathological dread of the lecture platform. The Deweyite philosophers believe that education arises from a sacred participation in The Group; the Adlerite philosophers believe that education arises from a sacred participation in The Book. Both systems collapse in practice when their temples are invaded by a man of intelligence who advances his convictions with force and thus occupies the center of the stage by the weight of a personality annealed in judgment.

This hostility to the dramatic in education points up the fear of the personal, the idiosyncratic, the unique fusion of the public and the private, that truly makes the man of culture and learning. Knowledge cannot be imparted in a spatial frame in which "ideas" are tossed back and forth like baseballs by players who pitch ball but are not the ball they pitch.

Knowledge is something far more subtle and profound. It is a stirring of the spirit seeded by the things that are. Often conceived through the instrumentality of books, more often germinated by the breath of nature, knowledge is most often communicated in one subjectivity by another subjectivity, in one person by another person. Sinking roots in a soil furrowed by the plow of history, knowledge takes on the contours of the land in which it is planted; it flourishes or languishes, is crooked or straight, rich or poor as is the land in which it has its being. Unless I know the land and its history, my education is but the dust of an abstraction.

I could argue endlessly with the

Foundation over this or that point: why Milton and not the Athanasian Creed; why Locke and not Cobbett; why the Greek drama and not the drama of the Christological heresies of the first centuries; why Newton and not Newman? But if I would fix my attack on one issue that sums up the spirit of the Hutchins-Adler program, I would select the cold-blooded rationalism that covers the entire movement. This rationalism grows out of contempt for history and culture, analogy and variety. It ices the mind bent on naked cerebration.

Let one instance stand as symbolic of the wintry spirit of this philosophy. Dr. Mortimer Adler—in a lecture distributed by the Foundation—declares that education is the making of an adult. While this observation is innocent enough, Dr. Adler goes on to assert that “children are the most imperfect of all human beings,” that they exist solely for the sake of their future manhood. Now from a certain angle this makes sense, but sense is about all it makes. It certainly does not make sensibility let alone sensitivity. It is a statement that could be uttered seriously only by a man devoid of the sense of mystery.

I do not agree with Dr. Adler that children are nothing more than potential adults. I maintain that children are unique human beings having a dignity and a worth simply in being as they are: children. I am reminded of the scriptural injunction about letting little children come unto Me and of the terrible warning that unless you become as children you shall not enter the Kingdom of Heaven. I am reminded of the poetry of Christmas and of all the carols of Christendom. I remember again that the picture of the child walking hand in hand with a graybeard strikes us all as completely natural, for “the child is father of the man.”

I cannot press into a syllogism or crystallize into an “idea” why it is that I feel as I do on this issue. I approach here a mystery and must walk in awe and tread carefully lest I break something beautiful in being itself. And it is this conviction of mine, growing out of my education, that sets me apart forever from the company kept by Dr. Hutchins and Dr. Adler.

Cold War in Southeast Asia

RODNEY GILBERT

Even while the world is hearing a great deal from the Chinese Communists themselves about the restive state of mind of their students and intellectuals, Red China is making a strenuous, often ruthless, and exceedingly expensive effort to take captive the mind of youth everywhere southward from Formosa into Indonesia, and westward into Burma. It is estimated that there are from twelve to fourteen million Chinese in the various states collectively known as Southeast Asia. Everywhere they control the retail trade; and, in the last few decades, they have become influential in banking, big business and in the import and export trade. Few are poor, most are well off and many are tremendously wealthy. Their grip upon the economy of the whole area is such that if they were solidly united in support of the Communist regime in China and devoted to the extension of its influence, the independence of the countries in which they are domiciled would not be worth much. It is the conquest of this area through the “overseas Chinese,” psychological first, then economic and then political, upon which Red China is bent—with the Kremlin’s enthusiastic support of course. In this campaign they have been successful enough so far to reduce many Occidental observers to pessimism and defeatism, and to worry everyone.

Why that worry is justified is the major theme of a book entitled *South of Tokyo* by John C. Caldwell (Regnery, \$3.50). I say it is the major theme because the reader is going to get half way through the book, wondering what the theme is, if it has any, before he discovers that it is not just a collection of character sketches or essays on Far Eastern topics—all very good reading and very interesting, but seemingly leading nowhere in particular.

The author starts off from Tokyo’s International Airport on a Civil Air Transport plane southward bound. This gives him occasion for a glowing account of the CAT company, founded by General Claire Chenault,

of Flying Tigers fame, immediately after the war. Then he devotes a chapter to a fellow passenger, Dr. Magnus Gregersen, a professor at Columbia’s College of Physicians and Surgeons, who became interested in China through his active interest in medical relief and so became the promoter of a great privately capitalized industry in Formosa—a shipyard which will soon be turning out 30,000-ton tankers. He then lands in Taipei, where he has been a frequent visitor, and switches his enthusiasm from courageous promoters of helpful private enterprises, to the members of the government which has made Formosa over. President Chiang Kai-shek gets quite a long and generally favorable sketch, illustrated by quotations from his diaries; and a contrast is drawn between Formosa and Red China which I think worth quoting:

The first [Free China] is led by educated men—young men, with Western ideals and ethics; the other [Red China] by murderers, cheats and liars. In Free China complete land reform and an industrial revolution have been accomplished by law; in Red China land reform took the lives of millions of men, has disrupted thousands of families, has sent wives into the streets—and has failed. In Free China, after initial failure on Formosa, the government has pulled itself together, has given the people freedom, stability, and the highest standard of living in Asia.

Finally we move into accounts of the operations of Red agents in Hong Kong, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Singapore and the British colony of Sarawak in northern Borneo. Their campaign Mr. Caldwell calls *kungsing* (conventionally spelled *kung-hsin*), meaning “attack on the heart.” Heart is used for mind in Chinese; so “kungsing agents” could be described as psychological warriors. In every major community there are scores of them; over the whole area, thousands.

Since they want the young people as converts, through whom they can influence the elders; and since the young people are almost all literate, the Red agent’s first target is the press. Through bribery, intimidation and, in some cases, actual violence, they have won control of a big ma-

jority of the Chinese language papers—making them either out-and-out Communist media or “neutralizing” them so that nothing favorable to the United States or to Free China, and nothing unfavorable to Red China, gets into print in these huge Chinese communities. To supplement this press control, masses of handsomely printed and illustrated books and magazines are introduced from Red China, countered by next to nothing from the Free World.

As a result of his conversations with Chinese groups in various communities, Mr. Caldwell believes that the most potent antidote to this huge propaganda effort is the story of what

has happened in Formosa—in contrast to what has happened in Red China. He discusses the efficiency and inefficiency of American government agencies pretty fully, and gives most praise to our International Cooperation Administration, which is, at little expense but with great success, diverting the student tide from Red to Free China. This operation, almost unheard of in this country, Mr. Caldwell credits to Vice President Nixon's initiative. The taxpayer, who will be horrified to read of the gross ignorance, blundering, apathy and defeatism of some American agents in Southeast Asia, will be heartened by this story.

over here. American reviewers, of course, could not be expected to perceive how closely Braine has paralleled many of the incidents and characters of Kingsley Amis' indifferent second novel, *That Uncertain Feeling*. And in Britain any notice of this must have been vastly outweighed by the twist Braine gave to the angry young theme. Amis' hero abandons the struggle and finds peace in familial tranquility. Braine's child is a cooler crumpet: he gets to the top of the table. And in doing so he finds the prize worthless. Thus casually and unexpectedly, in this trivial novel, a major theme in British literature comes to its conclusion.

After Anger, What?

EDWARD CASE

The controversy about the Angry Young Men has become Britain's literary argy-bargy of the decade. Who are they and what have they written? Let us agree to forget Colin Wilson, as we all must do in time, and stick to the “creative” writers. Those who constitute, as nearly as one can judge from here, the élite corps of belligerent beardlessness are John Wain, Kingsley Amis, John Osborne, Thomas Hinde and John Braine. They write about educated young men of the lower or lower-middle classes, perhaps themselves.

There has just been published in Britain a literary curiosity entitled *Declaration* (London: MacGibbon and Kee; to be published here in April by Dutton, \$3.75), a volume of credos and rambling soliloquies along angry young lines. Taken as a whole, the collection is contradictory and incoherent. But it is significant that this particular egg, infertile as it appears, was laid. A school of writing which has produced a manifesto, even a yolk of a one, must after all have some sort of organic unity and origin.

Both Kingsley Amis and John Wain published their first novels in 1953. Each achieved instant success. Amis' *Lucky Jim* (published here in 1954), proclaimed from Redbrick minarets, became the Koran of the movement. But Wain's first novel, *Hurry on Down* (published here in 1954 as

Born in Captivity), remains, in my estimation, the best novel written by any of this group.

The extraordinary success of *Lucky Jim* puzzles an American reader. It seems to be, and is, a lighthearted caper, a cut above Wodehouse, less mordant than Huxley—and, having said that, you've said it all. But for young Britons Jim Dixon, an irreverent young instructor at a provincial university, who bumbles into all sorts of scrapes and finally lands victoriously on his feet, seems to represent the nose-thumbing of the century.

Jim Dixon went about in a kind of coma of frustration, vexation and irresponsibility. In *Lucky Jim* this was merely humorous. But, as the other angry young novelists reported in, it became clear that all their leading men, such as Thomas Hinde's Larry Vincent and J. P. Donleavy's Sebastian Dangerfield, went about in similar comas. They were all revolting, and some of them are.

The most revolting, in all senses, is Jimmy Porter, the male lead in John Osborne's *Look Back in Anger* (Criterion, \$2.75), which is currently coining money on Broadway with its counterfeit and gimmicky passion. But equally meretricious is John Braine's novel, *Room at the Top* (Houghton-Mifflin, \$3.75), which has recently been the rage in Great Britain and has been widely praised

It was George Gissing, I think, who introduced the theme to British literature. It was the plight of the educated young man of the lower classes, a plight created, like the man, by the overwhelming rush of Victorian energy. In Gissing's time it was at last possible for a man not a genius to be born in the lower classes and yet attain the scholarly and cultural level of the gentry. And this was an essentially tragic situation, as Gissing saw it, for in most such cases these men were exhausted by the struggle, and those who were not found that the doors would not open—they had learned the password, but with the wrong accent. The keenness of the tragedy was in the estimation of the prize. For none questioned its value.

The theme became less tragic as opportunities advanced with the century. With H. G. Wells' major tragedy became minor. Both Wells' Mr. Lewisham, who was educated, and his Kipps, who was not, ruefully, but not despairingly, abandoned the struggle—but in each case with hope in his heart for his first-born child. Evolution would do the trick; Darwin had shown that the children would get on.

It remained for George Orwell to rewrite Wells and Gissing. He did so in his savage and obsessed novel, *Keep the Aspidistra Flying*, from which, in my judgment, all the products of the Angry Young Men derive. Where Gissing's characters sought to raise themselves within the system, Orwell's hero wishes not to overcome the system but, essentially, to overthrow it. Not only is the climb impossibly hard for him, but there is

nothing worth having at the top of the staircase.

With Orwell, as with Wells, the note of hope at the end is the unborn child. But with Orwell the significance of the child is not that Gordon Comstock has, vicariously, another chance. It is that in the simplicities and common joys of private existence are man's hope and salvation.

The Angry Young Men have variously been rewriting Orwell. For Orwell, success is unattainable and worthless even if within grasp. And Braine shows that it is attainable and, even so, worthless. The theme begun in Queen Victoria's time by Gissing

is, in Welfare Britain, exhausted.

The ideological shallowness of this in its contemporary version should be apparent to the discriminating mind. But the artistic implications are considerable. And the result, as Amis and Wain clearly indicate, is an abandonment of the ideological novel and a return to the individual, and to a novel that is soul-size. It is, in short, a return, through awkward avenues and indistinct byways, to the novel of character. I expect John Wain, who is, I think, a major writer in the making (even as shown in his disastrous second novel) to make this clearer in time.

they look for it, from this biography of American money from colonial times to the present. It is a scholarly piece of work, and the author, in the main, stays clear of value judgment; in fact, only when he describes the monetary policies of the New Deal does his statist petticoat show. An informative book.

F. CHODOROV

BRANN AND THE "ICONOCLAST," by Charles Carver (University of Texas, \$3.95). For a few years in the 1890's, a young man named William Brann published out of Waco, Texas, a monthly called *Iconoclast*, which achieved worldwide circulation and has remained a journalistic legend. His exclusive forte was invective, unabashed, holier-than-thou, and ponderously epithetic, with which he lashed out at any human weakness he thought his readers would like to see pulped—from morals at the local Baylor University to Consuelo Vanderbilt's feet. He made money, was publicly horsewhipped, nearly hanged, and finally shot in the back, "right where the suspenders crossed." As Charles Carver has now reconstructed his image, Brann must be given an A for breadwinning, but barely even the dunce-cap for his convictions. He simply wanted to provide the best for his family, and used "iconoclasm" because branding bigots paid better than branding steers. He had guts, though; and went down with his boots not only on, but—according to one eye-witness—"full of his own blood."

R. PHELPS

DUNBAR'S COVE, by Borden Deal (Scribner, \$4.50). It is not until midpoint in this novel that one may say, with certainty, that it is a sermon in corruption. For 175 pages, Matthew Dunbar, a pre-New-Deal individualist, holds his own against the forces of collectivist "progress"—represented by a faceless young TVA purchasing agent whose task it is to clear Matthew from Dunbar's Cove, so that it may be engulfed by the backwaters of a federal dam. But then Matthew sees that Norris Dam above his property has tamed the formidable flood waters of the Tennessee. The rest of the book is a long fall into the moral ruin of submission to "needful change"—although some gun play is necessary before the point is made with final clarity. Mr. Deal's style is potentially distinguished, but he has defaced it with a number of absurd mannerisms. Foremost among these is the incessant use of gerunds in the place of nouns (a solution is a "solving," a desire a "wanting," activity a "doing"), in a misguided attempt to achieve pace and vigor by choking every sentence with verbals. C. LOGAN

1935, brings the history of its development and progress down to the present day. As is now widely known, the AA's are obsessive drinkers who keep the compulsion at bay by going through what is clearly a religious experience, then embarking on a spiritual regime called "The Twelve Steps," and thereafter staying together through frequent meetings where they counsel and encourage one another. This story of Co-Founder "Bill W." and his colleagues is fascinating, and especially instructive for its account of the providential good sense which guided them in making their organization big, but neither wealthy nor bureaucratic. In these days of ubiquitous foundations, that in itself was an achievement. F. FARR

THE HISTORY OF THE DOLLAR, by Arthur Nussbaum (Columbia, \$4.50). Economists are of two minds on the subject of money. There are those, comparatively few in number, who hold that it is not a function of government to meddle with the media of exchange, that it has no more competence to fix the measurement of value than it has to set value on goods or services. The other school holds that in this field the government should be pre-eminent and that through its management of money the political establishment can regulate the entire economy. Both schools will get support, if

ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS COMES OF AGE, by A Co-Founder (Harper, \$4.00). A power of good has been done in the organization which calls itself Alcoholics Anonymous, and this book, by one of the two men who founded AA on June 10,

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"THE TRANQUIL WORLD of Dwight D. Eisenhower," by Wm. F. Buckley Jr., available in reprint form, 15¢, each, 100 for \$10.00. Dept. R, National Review, 211 E. 37th St., New York 16,

THIRD EDITION just out: Directory of "Rightist" Groups & Publications. Almost 1,000 patriotic listings. Send \$2 to Liberty & Property, Inc., P.O. Box 180, San Francisco.

To the Editor

The Tranquil World . . .

When you start making a tally of those who express a vote on "The Tranquil World of Dwight D. Eisenhower" (January 18), please save a place for me at the top of the list you designate for those voting very highest approval.

Deadwood, S. D. CHARLES R. HAYES

From NATIONAL REVIEW, January 18, by Wm. F. Buckley Jr.: "I am muttering a subversive prayer to our Lord to grant Washington another leader, and Gettysburg another squire."

I have been a reader of NATIONAL REVIEW from its inception, but how long I shall be able to continue to be one I cannot decide until my indignation cools off. The conclusion of your article on the President impresses me as wholly unnecessary, ill-mannered and uncivilized, regardless of one's views respecting the leadership of General Eisenhower.

Belfast, Me. ROBERT P. SKINNER

A couple of lines to express my whole-hearted appreciation of your shattering article, "The Tranquil World of Dwight D. Eisenhower." How just such a piece had to be done!

Bronxville, N.Y. JAMES PORTEUS

I have waited a long time, waded through many compositions, but finally it came today. "The Tranquil World . . ." is the clearest analysis I have come across of just what lies at the root of our Executive Branch's many shortcomings and failures.

Birmingham, Ala. C. E. HODGES

While I perhaps do not concur entirely with you in your article on the President, there is one sentence which clicks particularly with me: "I sometimes feel that it takes a tainted mind to understand—to really understand—the threat of Communism. To really understand Communism is to have touched pitch: one's view of man is forever defiled."

Also I fear there is quite a bit to your conclusion that the Eisenhower

approach sometimes does not attempt to solve problems, but refuses to recognize that problems exist. It seems to me that this applies particularly to the subject of Communist infiltration, as J. Edgar Hoover says, "into every facet of American life." I am thinking particularly of the Legion's attempt to discuss the subject of Communist professors at Columbia, only to be told that he [Mr. Eisenhower] had met every member of the faculty and knew that there were no Communists on it.

New York City H. G. CARPENTER

Wow! Your dissection of Dwight Eisenhower was devastating—and true.

As you made clear, Eisenhower is the result of the American people's worship of the voice that can pleasantly delude them. They have an abiding faith that high office has the power to charm enemies and criminals into acceptable behavior. . . .

Riviera Beach, Fla. THOMAS D. COLLINS

Research on the New School

Although Russell Kirk said, "Let no man stare in amaze," when he wrote his very obvious "plug" for the New School for Social Research in NATIONAL REVIEW of January 4, this reader is staring in great "amaze." It is difficult to grasp the fact that our greatly respected spokesman for conservatism is now a member of the faculty of the New School.

In Volume One of the Lusk Report, pages 1120 and 1121, one reads: "In 1919 a so-called bureau of Industrial Research was established in New York City. This organization cooperates with the New School for Social Research, which has been established by men who belong to the ranks of near-Bolshevik intelligentsia, some of them being too radical in their views to remain on the faculty of Columbia University." (The above-mentioned bureau is now known as the League for Industrial Democracy.)

Down through the years, the New School has lived up to its beginnings.

There was the unsavory incident of Hans Eisler, and the subterfuge used by the New School to get him into this country, by giving him employment as a music teacher, a position he held just long enough to get by, and then traveled through the United States as a Communist propagandist.

The New School catalogues read like the "Who's Who" for leftist society. At one time on its Board of Trustees, there was Eduard C. Linderman (nine Communist-front citations), J. Raymond Walsh (seven Communist-front citations); Channing H. Tobias (five Communist-front citations).

Even if one leaves out the pro-Communist taint, there is another fact to consider. An ex-Communist of high repute, honored and respected, said to me six months ago: "The New School for Social Research is a purely socialistic institution."

At the time the citizens of Queens County, in 1949, repudiated the then President of the New School, Dr. Bryn J. Hovde, when he was proposed as President of Queens College, the New School ran a Sunday ad in the *New York Times* in which it boasted of its "open contempt for dogma." It is also, in a word, anti-religious.

Mr. Kirk has announced with great bravado that he is now a member of the faculty of politics of the New School for Social Research. The entire body of Mr. Kirk's work in the past ten years is devoted to opposing the kind of thing nurtured at the New School.

Forest Hills, N.Y.

MONICA BARRY

Stars in Hiding

My husband and I chuckled so resoundingly at Aloise Heath's "Prosiness in Purple" [January 4] that you must have heard us way over on East 37th Street! We particularly love the "privacy-seeking stars."

Toronto, Canada

NAOMI HASTINGS

Egypt and the China Story

In the December 28 issue, Mr. Bozell, commenting on Freda Utley's recent book on the Middle East, says, "let Nasser take a page from Chiang and turn on his Red 'benefactors.'"

In the interest of good relations between Nasser and the West, I suggest that this is bad advice. Should Nasser peruse the Chiang Kai-shek

story he would note that the representatives of the U.S. State Department, aided by members of the IPR, labored unremittingly to discredit Chiang and to advance the interest of the Chinese Communists.

Nasser would also note the amazing performance of our special envoy and his incredible boast that "with a stroke of the pen" he had disarmed Chiang's army . . .

No, by all means, let us keep the Chiang Kai-shek story out of Nasser's reach.

San Francisco, Cal.

RICHARD H. CREEL

Free Trade in Confusion

It has been officially announced by Marion B. Folsom, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, that we are about to import a mob of Red professors to further confuse our youth and, at the same time, we will export some of our "liberal" professors to Russia. This will enable our professors to take a post-graduate course within the shadow of the Kremlin whose rulers are determined to destroy us!

How looney can we get?

New York City

EUGENE W. CASTLE

No Wonder We Are Losing

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